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Abstract 
Bias, or systematic influences that create errors in judgment, can affect psychological evaluations 
in ways that lead to erroneous diagnoses and opinions. Although these errors can have especially 
serious consequences in the criminal justice system, little research has addressed forensic 
psychologists’ awareness of well-known cognitive biases and debiasing strategies. We conducted 
a national survey with a sample of 120 randomly-selected licensed psychologists with forensic 
interests to examine a) their familiarity with and understanding of cognitive biases, b) their self-
reported strategies to mitigate bias, and c) the relation of a and b to psychologists’ cognitive 
reflection abilities. Most psychologists reported familiarity with well-known biases and 
distinguished these from sham biases, and reported using research-identified strategies but not 
fictional/sham strategies. However, some psychologists reported little familiarity with actual 
biases, endorsed sham biases as real, failed to recognize effective bias mitigation strategies, and 
endorsed ineffective bias mitigation strategies. Furthermore, nearly everyone endorsed 
introspection (a strategy known to be ineffective) as an effective bias mitigation strategy. 
Cognitive reflection abilities were systematically related to error, such that stronger cognitive 
reflection was associated with less endorsement of sham biases. 
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Forensic Clinicians’ Understanding of Bias 
 
Bias and judgment errors are problematic in any profession, but in forensic mental health 
assessments, errors can undermine justice. Biases may have profound implications for 
defendants’ lives, such as whether defendants are confined in a correctional versus psychiatric 
facility, how long they are confined, and the final disposition of their cases (e.g., guilty vs. not 
guilty by reason of insanity). Evaluator opinions carry considerable weight in many judicial 
decisions. For example, judges’ rulings in competence to stand trial hearings usually follow 
(>90% agreement) the opinions forensic evaluators provide (Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper, Wheeles & 
Ronan, 2004; Gowensmith, Murrie & Boccaccini, 2012). Although biases do not necessarily lead 
to an inaccurate conclusion, reliance on relevant factors (as opposed to irrelevant or biasing 
information) increases the likelihood of reaching an objective opinion.  
Given the potential impact of bias in legal decision-making, researchers have increasingly 
examined the presence of bias in forensic mental health evaluations. The primary aim of the 
current study is to examine the extent to which forensic psychologists are familiar with well-
known biases from the broader psychology literature, and strategies to mitigate the effects of 
bias. We explored whether psychologists could discriminate actual from sham biases and bias 
mitigation strategies. We also investigated individual differences between forensic mental health 
experts in their cognitive reflection abilities, as well as the relationship between cognitive 
reflection and knowledge of biases. 
What is Bias? 
Bias is the systematic deviation from the truth (West & Kenny, 2011), though it does not 
necessarily result in error (Dror, 2009). Laypersons and the legal community have long been 
skeptical of forensic mental health or medical experts, based on concerns they may be “hired 
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guns” (Hagen, 1997) swayed by adversarial or financial influences. But in reality, such overt 
partisan bias is probably relatively rare (Murrie & Boccaccini, 2015). Instead, implicit bias - 
automatic bias outside of examiner awareness - is probably a more common and insidious threat 
to the integrity and objectivity of forensic evaluations (Neal & Grisso, 2014). Susceptibility to 
implicit bias and errors in judgment is largely a consequence of mental “shortcuts” or heuristics 
that simplify cognitive processing (Kahneman, 2011). Like all humans, forensic examiners are 
susceptible to bias in their professional work. It is possible that forensic evaluators who are more 
knowledgeable about bias, and more open to workflow practices that minimize the effects of 
bias, manifest less systematic bias in their work. This project is a first step toward testing this 
hypothesis, exploring knowledge about common biases among psychologists doing forensic 
work.  
Bias in Forensic Mental Health Evaluations 
Researchers have been working to investigate whether forensic psychologists are 
susceptible to bias, documenting evidence that these professionals are, of course, human and 
susceptible to human biases, with the goal of developing strategies to mitigate bias. For example, 
Murrie and colleagues (2013) used experimental methods to examine adversarial allegiance, a 
phenomenon wherein forensic experts tend to unintentionally interpret assessment data in a 
manner that supports the retaining party. These researchers recruited trained forensic evaluators 
to participate in a “gold standard” training on two commonly used risk assessment measures 
(PCL-R and Static-99R), in exchange for scoring risk measures based on offender files. 
Researchers randomly assigned participants to believe they were serving the prosecution or 
defense, deceived them into believing they were performing formal consultation, and paid a 
consultation fee. Findings demonstrated that forensic evaluators tended to assign scores that 
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supported the party they believed retained them.  That is, defense-retained evaluators tended to 
assign lower risk scores and prosecution-retained evaluators tended to assign higher risk scores, 
revealing a clear adversarial allegiance effect.  
 In addition to (or interacting with) adversarial allegiance, many other forms of bias (e.g., 
confirmation bias, anchoring effect, bias blind spot, diagnostic momentum) may undermine 
objective evaluation. For example, in a recent study examining confirmation bias– the tendency 
to seek and rely on confirmatory information instead of seeking disconfirmatory information 
(Nickerson, 1998) – 93% of a sample of forensic psychologists demonstrated confirmation bias 
in an experimental task (Neal, MacLean, Morgan, & Murrie, 2017). In this study, participants 
received one of four randomly assigned vignettes and responded to a set of questions. Clinicians 
were first asked to rank-order the likelihood that the described patient may meet the DSM-5 
criteria for a series of possible diagnoses. They were then asked about which piece of 
information they would want first to allow them to effectively test their primary diagnostic 
hypothesis. The pieces of possible information differed based on the diagnosis the clinicians 
listed to be most likely, and included one that might confirm their hypothesis, and another that 
might disconfirm their initial hypothesis. Nearly all of the forensic psychologists in the sample 
chose the confirmatory piece of information, suggesting confirmation bias among clinicians. 
Although other types of bias have not been experimentally tested in forensic psychology, 
their potential implications are frequently discussed. For example, anchoring, or the tendency to 
weigh initially encountered information more heavily than later-encountered information 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), can lead to biased judgment. The potential effects of anchoring 
were illustrated using a hypothetical scenario involving a child custody case (Neal & Grisso, 
2014). The scenario involved an initial meeting with one likeable parent versus the other and 
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formulating a hypothesis about the case. Unfortunately, forensic evaluators are often presented 
with conflicting information, and may have difficulty re-formulating the original hypothesis 
using later received information. Anchoring, the tendency to rely heavily on the first piece of 
information, has also been documented in judicial decision-making among federal judges 
(Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001), though no study has explored the tendency with 
forensic evaluators. Similar to anchoring is diagnostic momentum, the tendency to become 
increasingly certain about a diagnosis and exclude other possibilities without sufficient 
skepticism (Croskerry, 2003).   
Although many of these biases are well-known in the literature, clinicians are more likely 
to identify bias in others than in their own work. This tendency to recognize bias among others, 
but remain oblivious to one’s own biases, is known as the “bias blind spot” (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 
2002), a well-known cognitive phenomena documented among laypersons and other 
professionals, including forensic mental health clinicians (Boccaccini, Chavevalier, Murrie, & 
Varela, 2015; Neal & Brodsky, 2016; Zapf, Kukucka, Kassin, & Dror, 2018). For example, Neal 
and Brodsky (2016) examined forensic psychologists’ perceptions of bias in their own and in 
their colleagues’ forensic evaluations. The bias blind spot was clear, with participants 
underestimating their own biases compared to their peers. Similarly, another survey of forensic 
mental health professionals from across 39 countries found that participants were more likely to 
perceive professional peers (78.1%) as influenced by bias than to perceive their own work 
(52.2%) as influenced by bias (Zapf, Kukucka, Kassin, & Dror, 2018). The current study 
expands on such prior research by directly examining evaluator knowledge of common biases 
and mitigating strategies. 
What Can Clinicians Do To Mitigate Bias in Forensic Mental Health Evaluations? 
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 To address biases in forensic evaluations, researchers have recommended various bias 
mitigation strategies (Borum, Otto & Golding, 1993; Murrie, Boccaccini, Turner, Meeks, Woods 
& Tussey, 2009; Murrie & Boccaccini, 2015; Neal & Grisso, 2014). Although many of these 
strategies are based on research in medical decision making (Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993; 
Neal & Brodsky, 2016; Williams, 1992), they are frequently mentioned as possible methods to 
reduce bias in forensic mental health evaluations. One such method is sequentially documenting 
information gathered in interviews (rather than relying on memory for any aspect of the 
evaluation), which aids in alleviating selective retrieval mechanisms and the fallibility of the 
examiners’ memory (Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993). Using such a technique prompts the 
mental health professional to examine all available data collected, allowing them to reduce the 
effect of heuristics that may otherwise skew decision making.  
Another method is seeking disconfirming (rather than only confirming) information, as is 
commonplace during cross-examinations in criminal proceedings (Borum, Otto, & Golding 
1993). Searching out such disconfirmatory information can help offset confirmation bias and 
reduce over-reliance on prejudiced sources.  
Neal & Brodsky (2016) recommended checklists to aid in reducing bias. This approach 
forces the evaluator to consider all types or sources of information prescribed by the checklist. In 
an example from medical research, Sibbald and colleagues (2013), randomly assigned 15 
cardiology fellowship trainees to one of 4 groups (control, verification with a checklist, 
verification without a checklist, and interpretation and verification with a checklist) and found 
that subjects who utilized a checklist were less likely to make errors in their diagnostic process.  
Another approach Neal & Brodsky (2016) suggest adopting from medical practice is 
“slowing down” workplace strategies, allowing the clinician to focus completely on a specific 
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task. They note how Moulton and colleagues (2010) interviewed 28 surgeons and observed them 
during a procedure in the operating room. Successful surgeons were observed to stop to modify 
the procedure as needed, rather than completing the task automatically. Their findings indicated 
that surgeons use slowing down (i.e., expending effort rather than using an automatic mode) as a 
strategy to refocus at critical times during an operation – a strategy that may be advantageous 
during forensic evaluations to minimize error and bias. Despite the value of the above noted 
strategies, however, the extent to which clinicians are aware of and implement these mechanisms 
in their clinical practice is currently unknown. 
Cognitive Reflection Abilities 
 Reflective thinking may help mitigate bias.  Reflective thinking was described in detail by 
Fredrick (2005) who developed the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) to measure the capacity to 
resist initial incorrect responses and override them with better, deliberative responses. The CRT 
is a series of questions designed to elicit incorrect, intuitive answers, as opposed to correct, 
reflective responses that require more deliberation. Among those who correctly respond to the 
CRT items, most initially consider the incorrect intuitive answer, but are able to override the 
intuitive incorrect response and reason through to the correct answer. Reflective reasoning may 
be important for other tasks that pull for quick intuitive judgments, such as clinical reasoning.  
Current Study 
 We examined the extent to which forensic psychologists are familiar with forms of bias 
frequently mentioned in the literature. To distinguish genuine recognition of actual biases from 
false self-reported familiarity (a social desirability effect in responding), we incorporated sham 
forms of biases. Likewise, we queried the extent to which forensic psychologists could recognize 
genuine bias-reduction strategies and distinguish them from sham bias-reduction strategies. The 
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purpose of this research was to examine forensic psychologists’ knowledge of biases that are 
relevant in forensic practice, understanding of strategies to mitigate the effects of bias, and 
ability to recognize real biases and strategies (and not endorse the shams) as related to their 
cognitive reflection. We hypothesized that clinicians would endorse familiarity with the real 
biases and strategies, but less so the shams. Additionally, we predicted that the rate of error (in 
terms of endorsing false biases or strategies) would be negatively related to participant’s scores 
on the CRT; that is, people with higher cognitive reflection abilities would make fewer errors. 
Method 
Participants 
We developed a large, national database of licensed psychologists with forensic interests. 
Specifically, we used licensing databases maintained by each of the 50 states within the United 
States. We reviewed the available specialty search options for each state separately. The search 
options on each state licensing database differed, and we maintained a document detailing the 
search criteria used for each state. We selected the search options that were most relevant to 
forensic evaluators and compiled a national list (e.g., court ordered evaluations, forensic, custody 
evaluations, disability determination, risk assessment, personal injury, criminal responsibility, 
juvenile delinquency, fitness for duty, capacity evaluation, court testimony). Our complete 
database included 2221 licensed psychologists across the nation with forensic interests. Once we 
had compiled the list of names, a team of research assistants found contact information for most 
of these psychologists, including professional mailing addresses, professional email addresses, 
and professional websites. We used a random number generator to randomly select participants 
from the overall list. Participants were then randomly selected from this list and contacted 
through email with an invitation to participate in this study.  
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Our goal in adopting this sampling procedure—rather than more common convenience 
strategies of posting study invitations to professional listservs or sending invitations to members 
of professional groups (e.g., American Psychology-Law Society)—was to better sample the 
population of practicing forensic psychologists. Our effortful sampling method affords two 
significant improvements over more common and convenient methods of sampling.  First, the 
new database we created represents the population of licensed psychologists with forensic 
interests across the entire nation, rather than only those who sought membership in a professional 
society.  Second, the database was sufficiently large that we could then randomly select 
participants from the population.1  
 We sent 727 email invitations, but 35 were discarded because of incorrect email address 
or because recipient replied they lacked forensic experience. Data were collected from 120 (17% 
response rate) psychologists: 45.8% female, 39% male, and the remaining 15.2% did not indicate 
their gender. The participant’s mean age was 55.24 years (SD = 11.64), and they were 
predominantly Caucasian (76.3%). The participants reported a mean of 18.51 years of experience 
as a forensic psychologist (SD = 11.08). Most of the participants were primarily employed in 
private practice (66.9%), and spent their time in clinical (non-forensic; M = 48.02%, SD = 
32.82%), or forensic-related practice (M = 33.78%, SD = 32.00%).  
 
  
Procedures 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that each state maintains its own licensing database and website for public access to that 
information. As such, our search criteria used for each state’s licensing database website differed based on the 
different search capabilities of each state’s website. Our search criteria are available on the Open Science 
Framework website associated with this paper - https://osf.io/sd6ut/ 
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Participants were invited by email, which included an explanation of the nature and 
purpose of the study, description of compensation for participation (i.e., $20 Visa gift card), and 
a link that directed participants to the 20-minute online survey via Qualtrics. Following consent, 
participants were asked to respond to the survey.  
Measures 
Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005).  The CRT is a brief questionnaire 
that measures abilities to inhibit initial instinctive but incorrect responses in favor of deliberate 
and reflective correct responses. The measure includes 3 right/wrong items, with a maximum 
score of 3 for reflective and correct responses. For example, “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. 
The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ____ Cents.” Given the 
items’ design to solicit an instinctive but incorrect response, higher scores are characteristic of 
those with a more advanced cognitive reflection abilities. The CRT has good reliability in this 
sample, Cronbach’s alpha = .72.  The average score on the CRT in this sample was M = 1.41 (SD 
= 1.17) items correct.  
Bias Familiarity Questions. Participants were asked to indicate familiarity (yes/no) with 
a list of biases and bias-reduction strategies.2 The list of biases and strategies used in this study 
were included following a review of relevant psychological research to determine those that are 
commonly mentioned in the literature. For example, participants were asked to indicate 
familiarity with the bias blind spot, diagnostic momentum, adversarial allegiance, in-group bias, 
and confirmation bias. In addition to real biases that research demonstrates affect clinicians’ 
reasoning processes, we also presented participants with misleading “sham” biases (fictional 
terms not found in the literature). For example, participants were asked to indicate familiarity 
                                                          
2 A copy of the survey as well as the deidentified database is located at https://osf.io/sd6ut/ 
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with the sutter effect, distinctiveness error, out-group sequestration, accommodation fallacy, and 
control bias. The misleading biases included in the survey were used to account for acquiescence 
bias (i.e., the tendency to agree; Carr, 1971), the illusion of familiarity (Whittlesea, 1993), and 
social desirability effects (in this case, an effort to appear knowledgeable and attuned to all 
potential biases). All real and misleading biases were presented in random order. Participants 
were allowed limited time (i.e., 25 seconds) to indicate familiarity with the various biases, in 
order to reduce opportunity to search the internet for bias terms.  
For the real biases with which participants indicated familiarity, they were then given 
limited time (i.e., 25 seconds) to answer multiple-choice questions to evaluate knowledge of each 
kind of bias. For example, participants who endorsed familiarity with Adversarial Allegiance 
were asked to select which of the following was the correct definition, “A) An expert’s tendency 
to reach an opinion that supports the side that retained the expert; B) Forming a close bond with 
the individual being evaluated to an extent that clouds judgment; C) Evaluating an individual 
with whom a prior relationship exists; or D) Accepting a bribe to make recommendations that are 
requested by the hiring party.”  
This procedure was created to avoid overreliance on self-report of familiarity and 
quantify the participant’s knowledge. The multiple quiz choices were developed by the authors 
to attempt to gauge genuine knowledge. The quality of the questions were informally assessed 
with a small sample (N = 8) of advanced graduate students to ensure the misleading biases were 
not grossly obvious, and the multiple-choice options on the bias knowledge quiz were 
appropriately challenging but accessible to those who had a basic knowledge of the terms.  
Bias Mitigation Strategies Questions. In addition to indicating familiarity with various 
biases, participants were asked to respond to questions about their use of strategies to mitigate 
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biases. The selected strategies reflected those that have been discussed in relevant literature as 
strategies to mitigate bias. As with the biases, we also included misleading or “sham” strategies 
by reframing biasing behavior as a strategy (e.g., relying on previous diagnoses, prioritizing first 
received information), and strategies that have been previously identified in the literature as 
ineffective (e.g., introspection – reflecting on ways one’s opinion may be biased). The bias terms 
and strategies were presented to the participants in random order.  
Demographics. Finally, participants provided demographic data (i.e., age, gender, race 
and ethnicity, professional training, licensure, years of forensic experience, board certification, 
and employment setting).  
 Results 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, participants endorsed familiarity with many of the actual 
biases and endorsed the sham biases as less familiar during the limited time period provided (M 
= 5.99 seconds, SD = 3.40): clinician-participants endorsed every one of the actual biases as 
more familiar than every one of the sham biases (see Figure 1). Clinicians were able to complete 
the bias knowledge quiz within the allotted 25 second time period (M = 18.36 seconds, SD = 
7.94). Results indicated that clinicians were widely familiar with confirmation bias – and they 
knew what it meant. The bias blind spot and adversarial allegiance—concepts more recently 
introduced to the forensic psychology literature—were familiar to a little over half of the sample, 
though participants were better able to define adversarial allegiance than the bias blind spot. Less 
than half were familiar with diagnostic momentum, and only about 20% could identify the 
correct definition. 
CLINICIANS’ UNDERSTANDING OF BIAS 
 
 
 
15 
 
Results indicated that about 70% of the sample recognized at least 3 of the 5 actual biases 
(M = 3.23 out of 5, SD = 1.33; see Figure 2). Only 1 participant failed to recognize any of the 5 
actual biases. To evaluate the participant’s tendency to agree with the different biases and 
strategies, sham biases were included. Results demonstrated that 39% endorsed none of the sham 
biases, though 61% endorsed at least one.  Eight percent endorsed 3 or more. 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Confirmation Bias
In-Group Bias
Bias Blind Spot
Adversarial Allegiance
Diagnostic Momentum
Control Bias
Accommodation Fallacy
Out-Group Sequestration
Distinctiveness Error
Sutter Effect
Figure 1. Percent Sham (Top) and Actual Biases (Bottom) Endorsed as Familiar 
(with Actual Biases Defined Correctly)
Defined Correctly Endorsed as Familiar
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Figure 2.  Simple Bar Count of Real (Left) and Sham (Right) Biases Endorsed as Familiar 
 
With respect to debiasing strategies, most clinicians endorsed using the research-
identified strategies (M = 8.44 seconds, SD = 3.71), with each of the effective strategies being 
endorsed by more than three-quarters of the sample (see Figure 3).  However, most clinicians 
(93%) endorsed using the ineffective strategy of introspection to mitigate bias. Few participants 
endorsed a behavioral description of confirmation bias and anchoring bias as strategies they use 
to combat bias. Overall, 93% of the clinician-participants reported using at least 4 of the 5 
effective strategies (M = 4.46, SD = .69; see Figure 4). All participants reported using at least 2 
of the research-identified strategies. Regarding the ineffective strategies, 94% of the sample 
endorsed 1 or 2 of them, but no one endorsed more than 3 of the 4 (M = 1.44, SD = .60]). 
Similarly, when participants were asked in an open-ended question to identify debiasing 
strategies utilized in their forensic practice, introspection was commonly identified as a utilized 
strategy by 30% of the sample. Other frequently identified debiasing strategies in the open-ended 
question included consulting (38%), using multiple sources of data (23%), and using validated 
measures (22%).
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Figure 4.  Simple Bar Count of Effective (Left) and Ineffective (Right) Bias Mitigation Strategies Used 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Use standardized tests and structured data collection methods
Seek disconfirmatory information
Consider the opposite (e.g., if retained by other side)
Use base rate information
Read books/articles on reducing bias
Introspection (reflect on ways my opinion may be biased)
Rely on past diagnoses when diagnosing
Narrow attention to info most consistent with hypothesis
Prioritize first info received rather than being swayed later
Figure 3. Percent Ineffective (Top) and Effective (Bottom) Strategies Endorsed
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As hypothesized, the CRT was negatively related to the rate of error on this task (in terms 
of endorsing false biases) was supported. Higher CRT scores were associated with fewer 
endorsements of sham biases, r = -.311, p = .004. However, contrary to the hypothesis, the CRT 
score was not correlated with the rate of error on the strategies task (i.e., endorsing sham 
strategies, r = -.10, p = .361). 
Discussion 
 Bias in forensic assessments can undermine justice and can have significant implications 
for defendants’ lives as well as the safety of the community. Mental health clinicians are 
consulted by courts to provide expert opinion to assist factfinders. Relying on biased information 
processing may decrease the objectivity of the clinician, and increase the likelihood of an 
erroneous opinion. The potential impact of bias in legal decision making has sparked recent 
research and discussion of policy changes to reduce its impact. For example, using blinding 
techniques (withholding potentially irrelevant and biasing information from the decision maker) 
across various fields has been proposed as the most surefire way to reduce or even eliminate bias 
in legal judgment (Robertson & Kesselheim, 2016). In San Francisco, for instance, prosecutors 
are utilizing “blind charging,” a technique by which a decision regarding whether to charge a 
defendant is made without the availability of demographic information in an effort to reduce the 
problematic pattern of racially-biased charging decisions (Williams, 2019). In the forensic 
sciences, labs are increasingly modifying policies and procedures to reduce examiner access to 
potentially biasing, task-irrelevant information. These changes suggest increasing awareness of 
the implications of bias and policy changes to address the potential negative consequences. 
  In this survey of a national sample of licensed psychologists with forensic interests, 
psychologists generally endorsed genuine familiarity with well-known biases and research-
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suggested bias mitigation strategies, as predicted. However, many were less skilled at 
discriminating between real and misleading strategies. Similar to previous findings (e.g., Neal & 
Brodsky, 2016; Zapf, Kukucka, Kassin, & Dror, 2018), participants in this study (93%) 
overwhelmingly endorsed the use of introspection as a strategy to mitigate bias. Neal and 
Brodsky (2016) explained that not only was introspection an unsuccessful strategy to decrease 
bias, but could even exacerbate preexisting biases held by the individual. Psychological research 
demonstrates that people are unable to access higher-order processing during introspection 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and that introspection can actually function as a source of bias blind 
spot (Pronin & Kugler, 2007). Of course, we do not claim that forensic psychologists should 
never attempt to self-examine their motives or their practice, but we do caution that introspection 
alone—i.e., looking inward for bias and finding no indication of bias—is certainly not sufficient 
to identify or mitigate the effects of bias. Indeed, it likely serves to create a false sense of 
reassurance.  In contrast, seeking behavioral evidence, such as examining patterns of behavior 
and decisions across cases, is a better method for ferreting out potential bias in one’s judgment.  
 The cognitive reflection task was used to measure the ability to question ones’ instincts 
and overcome an intuitive but potentially erroneous response by developing a more reflective 
response. As predicted, clinicians who were able to suppress spontaneous responses were better 
able to discriminate research-identified biases from shams. This suggests individual differences 
between clinicians that may impact bias and bias mitigation in forensic evaluations. 
 What these findings cannot tell us is whether the ability to discriminate actual from sham 
biases (and correctly defining actual biases) relates to any particular ability to mitigate such 
biases in one’s own judgment. Future research should address whether familiarity with biases 
helps clinicians actually reduce bias. Does acknowledging bias reduce actual bias?  Does explicit 
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description of strategies used to try to minimize bias have any effect on reducing actual 
bias?  Could it backfire, instead resulting in unintentional exacerbation of bias through a process 
akin to moral licensing (i.e., subconscious phenomenon in which confidence and positive self-
concept can make people more likely to engage in an immoral behavior by paradoxically making 
them feel freer to act badly because they consider themselves “good;”  Blanken, Van de Ven, & 
Zeelenberg, 2015)? Another important consideration is how these biases and strategies we 
include are not quite as clear-cut as we might like for them to be. For example, although 
prioritizing initially obtained information could increase the risk of anchoring effect (i.e., lead to 
bias), in subspecialties of forensic psychology (i.e., interviewing child victims of alleged 
offenses), prioritizing information obtained during an initial interview is purported as a strategy 
to reduce threats to validity (e.g., Wyatt, 1999). 
These study findings further our understanding of forensic psychologists’ knowledge of 
research-identified biases and strategies; however, it is not without limitations. Of primary 
concern is that the biases included in this study were presented via a research study and not as 
part of a traditional case referral or case material. It is possible (but unlikely) that examiners fail 
to recognize or endorse bias mitigating strategies in cognitive exercises such as that used in this 
study, but adequately utilize such strategies in their forensic practice. It is also possible (and 
perhaps more likely) that clinicians recognize and endorse familiarity with actual biases, but fail 
to recognize them or effectively mitigate their effects in their actual work, consistent with a bias 
blind spot.  In terms of the survey, a number of sham bias terms were vaguely similar to actual 
biases, which may have caused confusion among some participants. Thus, future studies that 
include sham terms should ensure that the terms are unquestionably unique to avoid confusion. 
In addition, although we programmed a time limit into the survey to reduce the likelihood that 
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participants would consult external sources for definitions or related information, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that some respondents might have searched an internet search engine to inform 
their responses. 
The low response rate in this study (17%) was limiting, however, not unexpected given 
general response rates in surveys like these. Future studies could utilize multiple methods of 
recruiting participants, or recruit through in-person or paper-based methods vs. online 
recruitment in an effort to increase response rates. Additionally, the pilot survey was 
administered to only eight graduate students. We designed it as a procedural pilot to finalize the 
methods, estimate time, and identify grossly obvious or problematic questions. But we could not 
use it to examine threats to validity (i.e., whether more than one response option could be 
correct, whether the question or items could be interpreted in numerous ways) were not 
measured, thereby potentially limiting the results. These limitations notwithstanding, studies like 
these will advance our understanding of clinicians’ abilities to reduce bias in forensic 
evaluations.  
These findings (along with Neal and Brodsky, 2016) suggest that forensic clinicians are 
in need of additional training not only to recognize biases, but to perhaps begin to effectively 
mitigate harm from biases. For example, in predoctoral (e.g., internship) and postdoctoral 
(fellowships), didactic training could address bias, recognizing bias, and strategies for 
minimizing bias. Additionally, supervisors could address identifying and reducing bias as a 
regular part of supervision (e.g., include this as part of case conceptualization). However, further 
research is needed to determine the types of training, and workflow strategies that best reduce 
bias. Future studies should focus on experimentally examining the presence of biases, and ways 
to mitigate their effects, in forensic evaluations. 
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